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A B S T R A C T
Scientists have argued that no more than 275 GtC (IPCC, 2013) of the world’s reserves of fossil fuels of
746 GtC can be produced in this century if the world is to restrict anthropogenic climate change to 2 C.
This has raised concerns about the risk of these reserves becoming “stranded assets” and creating a
dangerous “carbon bubble” with serious impacts on global ﬁnancial markets, leading in turn to
discussions of appropriate investor and consumer actions. However, previous studies have not always
clearly distinguished between reserves and resources, nor differentiated reserves held by investor-
owned and state-owned companies with the capital, infrastructure, and capacity to develop them in the
short term from those held by nation-states that may or may not have such capacity. This paper analyzes
the potential emissions of CO2 and methane from the proved reserves as reported by the world's largest
producers of oil, natural gas, and coal. We focus on the seventy companies and eight government-run
industries that produced 63% of the world’s fossil fuels from 1750 to 2010 (Heede, 2014), and have the
technological and ﬁnancial capacity to develop these reserves. While any reserve analysis is subject to
uncertainty, we demonstrate that production of these reported reserves will result in emissions of
440 GtC of carbon dioxide, or 160% of the remaining 275 GtC carbon budget. Of the 440 GtC total, the
42 investor-owned oil, gas, and coal companies hold reserves with potential emissions of 44 GtC (16% of
the remaining carbon budget, hereafter RCB), whereas the 28 state-owned entities possess reserves of
210 GtC (76% of the RCB). This analysis suggests that what may be needed to prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system differs when one considers the state-owned
entities vs. the investor-owned entities. For the former, there is a profound risk involved simply in the
prospect of their extracting their proved reserves. For the latter, the risk arises not so much from their
relatively small proved reserves, but from their on-going exploration and development of new fossil fuel
resources. For preventing DAI overall, effective action must include the state-owned companies, the
investor-owned companies, and governments. However, given that the majority of the world's reserves
are coal resources owned by governments with little capacity to extract them in the near term, we
suggest that the more immediate urgency lies with the private sector, and that investor and consumer
pressure should focus on phasing out these companies’ on-going exploration programs.
ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Anthropogenic climate change presents a serious threat to the
health, prosperity, and stability of human communities, to the
stability and existence of non-human species and ecosystems, and
to international political and military stability (IPCC, 2013, 2014;
World Bank, 2012; Center for Naval Analysis, 2014; Holy Father$ None of the material in this paper has been published or is under consideration
elsewhere.
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0959-3780/ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unFrancis, 2015). The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change commits its signatories to preventing “dangerous
anthropogenic interference” (DAI) in the climate system, a level
that has generally been thought to occur at about 2 C (UNFCCC,
1992; IPCC, 2013). This has raised the question of what proportion
of existing reserves of fossil fuels may be used without exceeding
that 2 C level. The International Energy Agency has concluded that
“[n]o more than one-third of proved reserves of fossil fuels can be
consumed prior to 2050 if the world is to achieve the 2 C goal,
unless carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology is widely
deployed” (IEA, 2012). Carbon Tracker concludes that a “precau-
tionary approach” would leave 80% of reserves in the ground (CTI,der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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reserves of fossil fuels, based on BP data (BP, 2014b), and World
Energy Council surveys (World Energy Council, 2013), which are in
turn based on data from resource and reserve assessments as
reported by national governments, geological surveys, coal
ministries, petroleum directorates, national oil companies, and
the like. A geographic and economic dispatch model also based on
global reserves data concludes that one-third of oil, half of gas, and
82 to 88% of coal reserves must remain unused to 2050 (McGlade
and Ekins, 2015).
Many of these reserves, however, are located in nations that lack
the productive capacity to exploit them. From the perspective of
disruptive climate change, the most pressing concern is not the
total quantity of fossil fuel in the Earth’s crust, which in any event is
an unknown quantity, but the proved recoverable reserves
reported by the largest producers around the world—i.e., the
companies poised to produce, reﬁne, and deliver those fuels to
global markets in the near term. This paper addresses the
questions: What are the reported proved reserves held by
companies with the capacity to deliver them to world markets?
What are the potential emissions from their expected production?
What percentage of the remaining 2 C carbon budget do they
represent?
2. Potential emissions of CO2 from proved reserves of oil,
natural gas, and coal
The conclusion that a large portion of the world's reserves of
fossil fuels must be left in the ground has led to concerns about the
risk of these reserves becoming “stranded assets,” and creating a
dangerous“carbon bubble” with large impacts on global ﬁnancial
markets (CTI, 2013, 2014a,b; CERES 2012; Generation Foundation,
2013; The Economist, 2014; Leggett, 2013). Analysis of many oil
and gas producers’ capital expenditures highlights the vulner-
abilities of highly valued assets if restrictions on carbon emissions
are put in place (CTI, 2014a,b). The total cumulative anthropogenic
carbon budget consistent with >66% probability of not exceeding a
2 C target has been estimated at 1.0 trillion tons of carbon (TtC)
(Allen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013; Matthews et al., 2009; Matthews
and Solomon, 2013; Meinshausen et al., 2009). If these ﬁgures are
correct, they suggest that no more than 275 GtC remain to be
emitted as carbon dioxide from fossil fuel use (see section on
carbon budget below). How do these ﬁgures compare with the
carbon that would be emitted if existing proved reserves of fossil
fuels are produced and used? This paper attempts to answer that
question by an analysis of reported proved reserves held by fossil
fuel corporations with the technical and ﬁnancial capacity to
produce them in the near future. This includes investor-owned
companies (IOC) such as BP and Peabody, state-owned Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) producers such as
Saudi Aramco and Sonatrach, and non-OPEC state-owned entities
(SOE) such as Petrobras (Brazil), CNOOC (China), Statoil (Norway),
and Gazprom (Russia). Our analysis does not forecast the rate of
each entity’s fossil fuel production, and therefore does not predict
whether current reserves will be produced by 2050, 2100, or
beyond. Clearly, the rate of production is relevant to emissions
scenarios, and therefore to the rate at which climate change may
occur (IPCC, 2014). However, investor-owned oil and gas compa-
nies have typical reserve-to-production ratios of 12  5 years, coal
producers 35 15 years, and OPEC-member companies
150  120 years. It is therefore reasonable to assume that absent
policies to alter current trajectories, nearly all investor-owned
reserves, and a lion’s share of state-owned reserves, will be
exploited before the end of the century.We also note that all fossil
fuel reserve estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty
arising from many diverse factors (Laherrère, 1999, 2011). Reserveestimates vary by source, year, and by fuel. They may also be
subject to deliberate inﬂation; OPEC oil and gas reserves, for
example, are not audited, but are widely reported by international
sources. Clearly, any attempt to quantify greenhouse gas emissions
that will result from the use of these reserves is subject to any
uncertainty already embedded in reserve estimates. Moreover, in
some sense the term “proved” is misleading, insofar as nothing is
proved until a resource has actually been extracted and sold.
Nonetheless, the term is used conventionally to refer to that
portion of a resource that is known to exist, has been well
delineated, and which companies are poised to develop. “Proved
reserves” is also a standard category that companies report to
shareholders and therefore is available to the public and
researchers and subject to peer review. Our analysis uses this
term in this conventional sense, and relies on publicly available
data that have been reported under this rubric.
We also note that for purposes of this analysis all carbon
emissions are viewed as equivalent, although we recognize that
with respect to the question of “dangerous anthropogenic
interference” (DAI) in the climate system, this is not strictly the
case.
3. Methods
This analysis is based primarily on company self-reported
estimates of proved reserves of recoverable oil, natural gas, and
coal, reduced for global average non-energy uses, and multiplied
by emission factors for each fuel type. Uncertainties arise regarding
estimated reserves and data sources (discussed below). In addition,
company operations, crude oil sources, operational emissions, and
the disposition and use of extracted, reﬁned, and marketed carbon
products vary from company to company. In the section that
follows, we explain what data and assumptions are used in the
analysis; the interested reader is referred as well to Heede for
further details (Heede, 2013, 2014).
Oil, natural gas, and coal companies report annual production
and recoverable reserves to investors and the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on the basis of SEC guidelines if the
company is based in the United States, is listed on U.S. securities
exchanges, or operates producing assets within the U.S. or its
offshore areas. The reserves attributed to the seventy investor-
owned and state-owned fossil fuel companies (plus the coal sector
in eight nation-states – China, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, North
Korea, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine – with
limited participation by investor-owned companies) in this
analysis are estimates based on international reporting standards
(in the case of non-OPEC companies) and on unknown standards
and limited transparency in the case of entities operating in
OPEC-member states, such as Saudi Aramco, Petroleos de
Venezuela, Sonatrach, and others. National Oil Companies that
are partially privatized are classiﬁed in this study as state-owned if
>50% of shares are owned by the government. This includes Statoil,
at 67% government-owned, Petrobras, 55.6% state-owned, and
Gazprom, 50.01% state-owned.
3.1. Data sources
Our analysis is based on reported reserves data, gathered chieﬂy
from the statements published by the U.S.-based companies for
year-end 2013 in Form 10-K (20-F or 40-F, by foreign and Canadian
companies with assets in the United States, respectively) ﬁled with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Additional sources
include statistics in the Oil & Gas Journal, the National Mining
Association, company websites, annual reports, and government
sources. State-owned companies do not submit statements to the
SEC (unless they own producing assets in the United States, such as
14 R. Heede, N. Oreskes / Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 12–20Statoil); for these companies we rely on reserve statements in
company reports (if available) or collected by the Oil & Gas Journal
(Xu and Bell, 2013; Xu and Kottungal, 2014). In cases where reserve
estimates are disputed by other sources we use the more
conservative estimate.
For example, the large reserves claimed by Coal India (Anand
2010) were disputed (Greenpeace India, 2013), and we adopted the
lower reserve estimate for the purposes of this study. Similarly,
estimated reserves of Russian oil and gas companies based on the
Russian classiﬁcation system leads to higher reserve estimates
than the more conservative 1P reserve estimates for state-owned
Gazprom and Rosneft that are based on the Society of Petroleum
Engineers’ Petroleum Resources Management System protocol
(SPE, 2011). SEC submissions show “proved reserves” of crude oil,
condensates, bitumen (heavy oil & oil sands), natural gas liquids
(NGLs), natural gas, and coal. Reporting typically includes
“developed” and “undeveloped” oil & gas reserves by geographic
region (SEC, 2009). Coal reserves, unlike oil and gas reserves,
combine proved and probable reserves, and often include coal rank
or heating values, and mining method (underground or surface).
3.2. Emission factors and non-energy uses
The reserves data for each entity – in million bbl (Mb) of oil &
NGLs, billion cubic feet (Gcf) of natural gas, and million tons (Mt) of
coal – are multiplied by the emission factors developed in the
Carbon Majors methodology (Heede, 2013, 2014) (Tables 1 and 2).
The analysis deducts for non-energy uses of each fuel (8.02% for
crude oil & NGLs, 1.71% for natural gas, and 0.016% for coal). This
permits estimation of expected emissions from the production of
the proved recoverable reserves for each entity.
Analyses of potential emissions incorporate assumptions that
may vary over the timeframe of their extraction, processing, and
consumption. International regulatory schemes, such as regional
carbon taxes, will alter the value of carbon resources compared to
non-carbon energy sources. Use of crude oil and natural gas may
shift to higher-value petrochemicals or fertilizers than assumed in
our analysis, leading to lower carbon fuel usage rates andTable 1
Combustion emission factors (also account for non-energy uses).
Energy source Carbon tC/unit Carbon dioxide tCO2/unit
Crude oil & NGLs 101.4 kgC/bbl 371.4 kgCO2/bbl
Natural gas 14.6 kgC/kcf 53.4 kgCO2/kcf
Lignite 328.4 kgC/t 1203.5 kgCO2/t
Subbituminous 495.2 kgC/t 1814.4 kgCO2/t
Bituminous 665.6 kgC/t 2439.0 kgCO2/t
Anthracite 715.6 kgC/t 2621.9 kgCO2/t
“Metallurgical coal” 727.6 kgC/t 2665.9 kgCO2/t
“Thermal coal” 581.1 kgC/t 2129.3 kgCO2/t
Crude oil: prior to non-energy deduction & adjustment for NGLs: 115.7 kgC/bbl,
423.8 kgCO2/bbl; Gas: prior to non-energy deduction: 14.86 kgC/kcf,or 54.44 kgCO2/
kcf; (kcf = thousand cubic feet).
Table 2
Emission factors for vented, ﬂared, and fugitive carbon dioxide & methane.
Entry Combustion kgCO2/tCO2 Flaring kgCO2/tCO2 Vented kgCO
Crude oil & NGLs 1000 15.94 3.83 
Natural gas 1000 1.74 28.53 
Coal 1000 ne ne 
ne: not estimated. GWP factor for methane of 21  CO2 on 100-year time horizon, per emissions. We have not attempted to predict such future
ﬂuctuations in this study.
3.3. Analytical approach
The analytical approach developed in Heede (2014) is adopted
here to estimate potential emissions from the combustion of
reported proved recoverable reserves (less non-energy uses)
declared by the 78 entities included in the analysis (Heede,
2013, 2014). The fossil fuel production entities were selected from
leading producers of coal, oil, and natural gas, deﬁned as producing
8 MtC or more in a recent year. Additional emissions from
extraction and processing of the reserves – such as the venting
of CO2 from the processing of raw natural gas into marketable fuel,
CO2 from ﬂaring of associated gas at well heads not linked to gas
pipeline networks, and vented and fugitive methane from oil,
natural gas, and coal production – are also estimated in order to
capture the complete emissions resulting from the production and
delivery of carbon fuels to end users. Other estimates of potential
emissions from reserves (IPCC, IEA, Carbon Tracker) assume that all
of the carbon in the fuel reserves is combusted to the atmosphere.
This study makes the more realistic assumption that not all carbon
in fuel reserves is burned; we deduct for carbon in the products
used for non-energy purposes, such as waxes, lubricants,
petrochemicals, carbon ﬁbers, pigments, fertilizers, steelmaking,
and road oil. The methodology also accounts for emissions from
subsequent combustion of non-energy products, such as tyres,
waxes, lubricants, and plastics. We calculate potential emissions
from declared reserves published by each company based on
prevailing commodity prices.
Every producing company’s operational emissions differ, since
coal mining depth, methane ventilation or utilization, leakage
control, quantities of CO2 entrained in raw natural gas (which
varies from ﬁeld to ﬁeld), efﬁciencies in reﬁneries and pipelines,
and the ﬂaring of associated gas vary by company and producing
region (Gordon et al., 2015). Emission factors for these ancillary
sources are taken from international sources such as IPCC, IEA, EIA,
and EPA, as well as scientiﬁc organizations, engineering societies,
and trade associations. Documentation of the methodology and
emission factors is detailed in Heede (2013, 2014).
3.4. Caveats and sources of uncertainty
As noted above, reserve estimates are intrinsically uncertain:
they vary by year on the basis of new discoveries, reserve additions,
extensions of known reserves, reductions for produced quantities,
ﬂuctuating commodity prices, and new engineering estimates that
shift reserves from the “probable” into the “proved” categorization.
In this respect our analysis is conservative, insofar as rising prices
in the future may lead to currently uneconomic resources
becoming economic, thus expanding proved reserves.
In addition, many analysts believe that reserve statements by
some state-owned oil and gas companies, notably Saudi Aramco
and other OPEC members, are inﬂated by as much as 300 billion bbl2/tCO2 Methane kgCH4/tCO2 Methane kgCO2e/tCO2 Total kgCO2e/tCO2
1.92 40.39 1060.2
9.88 207.44 1237.7
4.03 84.73 1084.7
IPCC SAR.
Table 4
Major carbon fuel producers & world reserves, 2013, by ownership.
Fuel Major producers units Major producers, percent of world
Crude Oil & NGLs Gb
Investor-owned 120 7.1%
State-owned 1265 74.9%
Total oil 1385 82.0%
Natural Gas Tcf
Investor-owned 433 6.6%
State-owned 4387 66.9%
Total natural gas 4820 73.5%
Coal Gt
Investor-owned 43 4.8%
State-owned 28 3.1%
Nation-states 347 38.9%
Total coal 418 46.9%
R. Heede, N. Oreskes / Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 12–20 15(Gb), or roughly one-quarter of OPEC reserves (Laherrère, 1999,
2011; Deffeyes, 2001; Sandrea, 2003; Mushalik, 2004; Simmons,
2005; Mearns, 2010; Tippee, 2010). OPEC reserve estimates are not
audited, independent geological assessments are not available,
uniform and transparent reserve protocols are not used, and most
OPEC-member state-owned companies do not adjust reserves for
annual production. Moreover, OPEC production quotas are tied to
reserves, creating a strong incentive toward reserve inﬂation
(Laherrère, 2011; Tippee, 2010). Reserve inﬂation may not be
limited to state-owned entities. SEC guidance is explicit on the
matter of reserve estimation and reporting, although companies
have run afoul of reporting standards. For example, Royal Dutch
Shell admitted “without . . . wrongdoing” to overstating reserves
by 3.9 billion bbl (Gb), or 20%, and was subsequently ﬁned
$27 million and ordered to pay $353 million in compensation to
shareholders (Anon., 2004; Treanor, 2009).
The present analysis does not attempt to second-guess the
accuracy of reported reserves, nor to predict future ﬂuctuations in
exogeneous variables that may affect reserves. Rather it relies on
reserve assessments by each considered entity – typically for year-
end 2013 – as reported to shareholders and the SEC, or based on
other publicly available estimates as described above. Reserves
held in global Strategic Petroleum Reserves and commercial stocks
have not been included in this analysis. Total storage is 4.1 Gb, of
which 2.7 Gb is held by private industry and 1.4 Gb stored in
government facilities. The largest reserve – the U.S. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve – held 0.727 Gb at year-end 2010 (EIA, 2013).
Storage of 4.1 Gb represents potential emissions of 0.42 GtC, a small
ﬁgure relative to global totals.
4. World reserves
According to the BP global reserve assessment for 2013 (the
same year for which we calculate emissions from company
reserves), proved recoverable oil & NGL reserves total 1668 Gb,
natural gas reserves total 6558 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and 892
billion tons (Gt) of coal (BP, 2014b).
Full production of global fossil fuel reserves will lead to an
estimated 746 GtC (2734 GtCO2) of carbon emissions, based on the
methodology adopted from Heede (2014) (Table 3). This includes
emissions of CO2 from ﬂaring and venting associated with theTable 3
World fossil fuel reserves by type and potential emissions, 2013.
Type Reserves (units) World GtC World GtCO2 Percent of total
Oil & NGLs 1688 Gb 171.1 626.9 22.9%
Natural gas 6558 Tcf 95.6 350.4 12.8%
Coal 892 Gt 479.5 1756.9 64.3%
Total na 746.2 2734.2 100.0%
Reserves data: BP (2014b).
Table 5
Potential emissions of major carbon producers’ reserves, by fuel.
Source Product emissino GtC Flaring & vent
Investor- & state-owned:
Oil & NGLs 140.4 2.8 
Natural gas 70.3 2.1 
Coal 39.1 na 
Subtotal 249.8 4.9 
Nation-states:
Coal 185.4 0.0 
Total, all entities 435.2 4.9 production of marketed carbon fuels, and deducts for non-energy
uses.
5. Carbon reserves and potential emissions
In the following analysis we focus on the reported proved
reserves declared by 78 of the largest fossil fuel producers whose
historic production of carbon fuels from as early as 1854 to 2010
contributed 63% of global emissions of carbon dioxide and
methane since 1751 (Heede, 2014). Of the extant 78 entities that
hold fossil fuel reserves, 70 are incorporated entities, of which
42 are investor-owned and 28 are state-owned companies. These
companies possess 82% of oil, 73% of natural gas, and 8% of total
world reserves of coal (Table 4). In addition, eight government-run
industries in nation-states such Poland and China possess 39% of
world coal reserves. This analysis focuses on the reserves held by
the 70 investor- and state-owned companies.
The state-owned companies produce three-quarters of world
oil and have been reported to possess 90% of the oil reserves (World
Bank, 2011), although our analysis suggests state-owned compa-
nies control 75% of global reserves (Table 4).
The seventy incorporated investor-owned companies (IOC) and
state-owned entities (SOE) have declared total proved recoverable
reserves of 1385 Gb of crude oil and NGLs, 4820 Tcf of natural gas,
and 71 Gt of coal (Table 4). The oil reserves are chieﬂy held by the
28 state-owned companies that are OPEC members, and by a small
number of state-owned companies that are not OPEC members,
such as Rosneft and Gazprom in Russia, Statoil in Norway, and
Petrobras in Brazil. In contrast to oil and gas reserves, the majority
of coal reserves are held by the eight nation-states, primarily China
and the Russian Federation.
Table 5 summarizes estimated potential emissions by fuel type
from fossil fuel products, ﬂaring and venting of CO2, and fugitive
methane from operations of the 70 SOEs and IOCs (see
Supplementary materials for emissions estimated for the 70ing GtC Total carbon GtC Fugitive methane GtCe
143.2 5.7
72.4 14.6
39.1 3.3
254.7 23.6
185.4 15.7
440.1 39.3
Table 6
Potential emissions of major carbon producers’ reserves, by ownership.
Source Product emissions GtC Flaring & Venting GtC Total carbon GtC Fugitive methane GtCe
Investor-owned 44.0 0.4 44.4 4.0
State-owned 205.8 4.5 210.3 19.6
Nation-states 185.4 0.0 185.4 15.7
Total 435.2 4.9 440.1 39.3
16 R. Heede, N. Oreskes / Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 12–20companies’ reserves). Table 6 shows the same results by ownership
category for investor- and state-owned entities, and potential
emissions of 185 GtC from 347 Gt coal reserves declared by the
eight nation-states, plus 15.7 GtCe of methane emissions associat-
ed with coal mining. Fig. 1 shows potential emissions estimated for
the 42 investor-owned and the 28 state-owned oil, natural gas, and
coal companies, and Fig. 2 shows potential emissions from the
reserves declared by the 30 largest investor-owned and state-
owned fossil fuel companies – and the dominance of the latter
group in world reserves. The end use combustion of carbon fuels isFig. 1. Major producers’ potential emissions from reserves (IOCs, SOEs).
Fig. 2. Major producers’ emissions from largest thirtythe principal source of potential emissions from the production of
reserves, accounting for 90% of total estimated emissions, on
average. The direct operational emissions from ﬂaring, venting,
and fugitive methane associated with the production, processing,
and delivery of fuels (10% of the total, on average) are also
estimated. Methane emissions are not compared to the remaining
carbon budget; see discussion below. Methane is a signiﬁcant
source of direct emissions from natural gas, coal, and oil
production (see Table 2 for relative contributions), and while
methane emissions are not compared to the remaining carbon
budget, we present the results for context and future analysis. We
use the 100-year global warming potential factor for methane of
21  CO2, adopting the standard for national greenhouse gas
inventories using values in IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC
Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories).
6. Results: most reserves are in state-owned entities and nation-
states
The results of our analysis show that the lion’s share of potential
emissions from proved reserves are not in the hands of publicly-
traded, investor owned corporations, but in the hands of state-
owned entities and nation-states. Even if OPEC reserves are
inﬂated, as they may be, there is no question that the majority of
reserves of both oil and natural gas are held by state-owned
companies.
The state-owned companies hold the largest reserves of oil and
gas, totaling 210 GtC of potential emissions from product end use,
ﬂaring, and venting, dominated by oil reserves: 131 GtC from oil,
66 GtC from natural gas, and 14 GtC from coal. The eight nation- investor- and state-owned companies’ reserves.
Table 7
Major carbon producers by ownership compared to the IPCC remaining carbon budget.
Source Major producers GtC IPCC budget GtC CM percent of IPCC budget
Investor-owned 44.4 275 16.1%
State-owned 210.3 275 76.4%
Nation-states 185.4 275 67.4%
Total 440.1 275 160.0%
Table 8
Major carbon producers by fuel compared to the IPCC remaining carbon budget.
Source Major producers GtC IPCC budget GtC CM percent of IPCC budget
Oil & NGLs 143.2 275 52.1%
Natural gas 72.4 275 26.3%
Coal 224.5 275 81.6%
Total 440.1 275 160.0%
R. Heede, N. Oreskes / Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 12–20 17states with government-run coal industries possess reserves with
potential emissions of 185 GtC. In contrast, the 42 investor-owned
oil, natural gas, and coal companies hold reserves with potential
emissions of 44.4 GtC, including 0.4 GtC from ﬂaring and vented
CO2. Tables 7 and 8 and Figs. 3 and 4 compare our results with an
estimated remaining carbon budget of 275 GtC (based on a
cumulative carbon budget of 1000 GtC) (Allen et al., 2009;
Meinshausen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Matthews and
Solomon, 2013; IPCC, 2013; see also CTI, 2013).
Reserves declared by the 42 investor-owned companies
represent emissions equivalent to 16% of the remaining carbon
budget, whereas the 28 SOE reserves are equivalent to 76%, and the
coal reserves of the eight nation-states are equivalent to 67%. The
reserves of the seventy IOCs and SOEs (255 GtC) are equivalent to
93% of the remaining carbon budget of 275 GtC (Fig. 3). Estimated
potential emissions from the reserves held by all three ownership
categories – 440 GtC – exceed the remaining carbon budget by 60%
(Fig. 4).
7. Discussion
Our analysis conﬁrms the results of prior studies that conclude
that a substantial fraction of the world’s fossil fuel reserves mustFig. 3. Potential emissions from reserves vs. IPCCremain unburned if the world is to achieve the goal of maintaining
anthropogenic climate change below 2 C (Allen et al., 2009;
Meinshausen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Matthews and
Solomon, 2013; IPCC, 2013; CTI, 2011, 2013). However, it diverges
from previous studies in two important respects. One widely cited
study is Carbon Tracker’s Unburnable Carbon (CTI, 2011). CTI
estimates emissions from proved reserves of the 100 largest oil and
gas companies and 100 largest coal companies listed on stock
exchanges, but excludes most state-owned companies included in
our analysis. Our study makes clear that consideration of state-
owned companies is essential to understanding the threat of the
use of existing proven reserves of fossil fuels. Because of the large
proportion of reserves in the hands of state-owned entities, DAI
cannot be prevented by focusing on private sector activity alone.
This conclusion has important implications for who needs to be
“at the table” in climate negotiations. Victor (2011) has suggested
that existing frameworks for international negotiation have erred
by being too inclusive, and therefore difﬁcult to manage and likely
to fail. He argues that future negotiations should focus on creating
a small club of key countries, by which he means the largest annual
emitters: China, the United States, and the European Union. Should
these countries become “enthusiastic” about a climate agreement,
signiﬁcant progress could be achieved, creating a positive incentive remaining carbon budget (IOCs and SOEs).
Fig. 4. Potential emissions from reserves vs. IPCC remaining carbon budget (IOCs, SOEs, and nation-states).
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can acknowledge the politically pragmatic quality of that sugges-
tion, an analysis that takes into account the potential impact of
future use of proved reserves suggests a different mix of essential
parties. Table 9 compares the top ten emitting countries (both
current and historic) with a list of the nations that hold the lion's
share of reserves in the hands of state-owned entities, or in the
hands of the states themselves. One immediately discerns that the
top ten reserve holders are not the same as the top ten emitters. In
the former group, Australia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and
Kazakhstan come to the fore. One may accept the argument that a
focus on a smaller number of countries increases the odds of
success, but come to a different conclusion about which countries
need to be involved in those agreements. Negotiations to date have
focused on the end users of fossil fuels, in effect, focusing on
demand rather than on supply. The analysis presented here
suggests the importance of attention to supply as well.
A second important difference between the analysis presented
here and earlier studies involves the role of investor-owned
entities. Forty-three companies are common to our study and
Carbon Tracker’s, such as Peabody, ExxonMobil, Rio Tinto, Chevron,
BP, Shell, BHP Billiton, etc. Potential emissions from proved
recoverable reserves held by all of the 43 companies estimated in
both this and CTI's analyses total 72 GtC and 108 GtC, respectively
(this study, and CTI, 2011). (The CTI analysis excludes state-owned
oil and gas companies, except for those partially privatized, such as
Statoil, Gazprom, and Petrobras.) Our respective estimates ofTable 9
Top Ten Countries ranked in terms of historic emissions, current emissions, and
reserves.
Rank Historic emissions Current emissions Reserves
1. United States China United States
2. China United States Russia
3. Russia India China
4. India Russia Australia
5. Brazil Japan India
6. Germany Germany Iran
7. United Kingdom Iran Saudi Arabia
8. Japan South Korea Venezuela
9. Canada Canada Kazakhstan
10. Indonesia United Kingdom Canada
Historic emissions include land use changes (Matthews et al., 2014); current
emissions (Boden et al., 2013); reserves calculated from BP (2014b) by the authors.potential emissions from coal reserves are in closer agreement
than estimated emissions from oil reserves. CTI’s estimates for
some oil and gas companies (such as Chevron, BP, ExxonMobil, and
Hess) exceed our estimates by a factor of four or more.
The primary reason for the differing results is that CTI did not
quantify potential emissions from reported proved oil reserves but
“extrapolated the oil reserves to maintain production to 2050”
(Leaton, 2014). In other words, whereas our analysis is based solely
on existing reserves, the CTI analysis assumes that oil companies
will continue to explore and develop new reserves through 2050,
and includes this extrapolation in their analysis.
We believe this is a crucial difference, insofar as it focuses
attention on the problem of the on-going exploration for new
resources, particular of oil and gas, by investor-owned companies.
While our results demonstrate the importance of state-owned
entities in preventing DAI, they also point to an important aspect of
the role of private-sector corporations not addressed in previous
studies. In contrast with previous analyses, our results suggests
that the use of the existing proved reserves held by the largest investor-
owned corporations does not lead to climate warming above the
2 degree limit. However, exploration for and development of new
reserves – beyond those that are presently proved – will exceed the
carbon budget and push the global climate well past the 2-degree
limit.
That is to say, so far as the contribution from private sector
activity goes, the core threat to the goal of holding anthropogenic
temperature increase below the 2 C target is not the exploitation
of existing proved reserves, but in the continued exploration for
and development of new ones. This has important implications for
how investors think about the role of the private sector in the
problem of anthropogenic climate change, and the problem of
stranded assets.
Our analysis suggests that what is needed to prevent DAI is
different when one considers the state-owned entities v. the
investor-owned entities. For the former, there is a profound climate
risk involved simply in the prospect of their developing their
proved reserves. Negotiations should therefore pay serious
attention to the question of how the nations that own these
entities may be persuaded not to develop the reserves that they
have already proven out. However, when considering the question
of private sector entities and the risk of reserves becoming
stranded, our study shows that existing reserves need not become
stranded. The risk to private sector investors arises not so much
Table 10
Selected investor-owned & state-owned companies: potential emissions from reserves, 2013.
Entity Oil & NGL MtCO2 Natural Gas MtCO2 Coal MtCO2 Vented & Flared MtCO2 Methane MtCO2e Total MtCO2e
National Iranian Oil Company 58,426 63,741 3085 15,583 140,835
Saudi Aramco 98,744 15,539 2423 7212 123,919
Gazprom 3013 35,836 1144 7556 47,549
Peabody Energy 18,074 1,531 19,606
BHP Billiton 325 541 14,097 23 1,320 16,306
Consol Energy 213 9422 6 843 10,485
ExxonMobil 4917 3840 213 995 9966
BP 3740 2457 148 661 7006
Royal Dutch Shell 2459 2269 117 570 5416
Chevron 2357 1557 94 418 4426
ConocoPhillips 2051 1089 74 309 3523
Statoil 861 984 47 239 2131
Potential emissions calculations by Heede. See Supplementary materials for additional companies.
R. Heede, N. Oreskes / Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 12–20 19from proved reserves of investor-owned companies but from these
companies’ on-going exploration and development of new fossil
fuel resources.
It has been estimated that investor-owned companies invest
over $700 billion per year in exploration and production in order to
assure continued ﬂow of carbon fuels well beyond the exhaustion
of current reserves (Barclays, 2013). These companies, particularly
the multinational oil and gas companies, have been the focus of
divestment campaigns and of analyses of stranded assets (CTI,
2013, 2014b,c; Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2013;
Generation Foundation, 2013; Gore and Blood, 2013; The Econo-
mist, 2014; University of Oxford Stranded Assets Program, 2014;
Cleveland and Reibstein, 2015). Their accountability to investors,
pension funds, and university endowment managers makes them
highly visible targets for such concerns, which appear well-
founded insofar as corporate reports make clear their intent to
invest trillions of dollars of additional capital in exploration and
production in the next several years and even decades
(ExxonMobil, 2014b; Royal Dutch Shell, 2014; Frumhoff et al.,
2015; CTI and ETA, 2014). Our analysis suggests that investor
concern should be focused on dissuading these corporations from
further investment in fossil fuel exploration and development.
8. Conclusion
Much of the concern expressed to date over stranded assets is
focused on the investor-owned oil and gas companies, presumably
because of the leverage that investors, regulators, and lenders have
over the economic and regulatory environment in which these
companies operate. These companies represent a substantial risk
to the 2 C target not so much because of their proved reserves
(most of which will likely be exhausted by 2030 or earlier), but
because of their ability and expressed intent to continue to explore
for new sources of fossil fuels, and to convert existing probable and
possible reserves into additional proved reserves (ExxonMobil,
2014a,b; Royal Dutch Shell, 2014; BP, 2014a). Given this, we suggest
that investor and consumer pressure should focus on the question
of phasing out exploration for new resources, especially in high-
cost environments and of carbon-intensive resources (McGlade
and Ekins, 2015).
However, investor-owned companies hold only 7.1% of oil
reserves and 6.6% of natural gas reserves; the majority of current
production and the vast majority of reserves are held by companies
that are not publicly traded (Table 10). While the ﬁnancial risk
faced by investor-owned oil and gas majors may be ameliorated by
prudent shedding of high-cost reserves, or by a comprehensive
change in investment priorities (including in non-carbon energy
sources), the objective of limiting future production of fossil fuels
in order to achieve the 2 C temperature target will not succeed ifproduction of reserves held by state-owned oil, natural gas, and
coal companies is not also brought under control. For preventing
DAI overall, effective action must include the state-owned
companies and their governments.
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